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In the 2016 film Doctor Strange, the title character undergoes a radical transition from successful neurosurgeon 
to highly skilled sorcerer. Unsurprisingly, he finds this transition difficult, in no small part because he thinks 
that sorcery seems somehow “unscientific.” Nevertheless, he eventually comes to adopt sorcery as 
wholeheartedly as he had embraced medicine. Some of his reasons for making this transition are personal, 
such as his desire to fix his injured hands and, later, to help others. Strange also displays the same sorts of 
motivations that might drive any scientist: his intellectual curiosity drives him to understand how the Ancient 
One cured a paraplegic, and his desire to make a positive difference leads him to push the boundaries of 
sorcery. 
This chapter will examine what Strange’s transition can teach us about the nature of scientific inquiry. More 
specifically, we’ll think about when it might make sense for scientists like Dr. Strange to change their approach. 
This will also allow us to explore what it means to practice science more generally. Some of what we learn 
might be surprising. For example, while it might seem obvious to us (and maybe even to Strange) that sorcery 
can’t count as a science, there are reasons for doubting this quick conclusion, at least in the sort of world that 
Dr. Strange lives in. Finally, we’ll consider what all of this means for science in our world, where things differ 
quite significantly. 
1 BACK WHEN STRANGE WAS NORMAL 
Our investigation starts with the ideas of the scientist, historian, and philosopher Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996). 
In his 1962 book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn argued against the widely held view that scientific 
progress was the result of the application of a universal “scientific method” that assured regular, incremental 
progress towards the truth.1 Instead, Kuhn thought that “scientific revolutions” often looked quite a bit like 
Strange’s experience, where scientists refused to change their fundamental ideas about how the world works, 
or their paradigms, until a series of crises forced them to. If and when they finally did change paradigms, they 
had to undergo their own version of Strange’s conversion experience, which required them to relearn exactly 
what the “world” is.  
While Kuhn’s examples are chosen from this history of physics, astronomy, and chemistry, his ideas have 
much broader import. After all, if rival scientific paradigms really are as different as, say, neurosurgery and 
sorcery, it might seem that the objectivity of science itself is threatened. It’s for this reason that the story of 
Doctor Strange—who has the ability to understand multiple paradigms—is potentially so interesting, even to 
readers in a world without sorcery. 
Kuhn, like Strange, received his initial training in a discipline very different from that which would eventually 
make him famous. Kuhn earned a doctorate in physics from Harvard University but, in the early years of 
career, came to feel that many of his best, most original ideas were actually about the history of science. In 
particular, he thought that many people had wildly inaccurate views of how science had actually worked in the 
past, which led them to be confused about how it worked in the present. 
According to one popular view of science at the time, the falsificationism advocated by philosopher of science 
Karl Popper (1902-1994), scientific theories (as opposed to, say, political theories) were defined by the fact 
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that certain sorts of observations could show them to be wrong, and scientists were the sort of people who 
were willing to change their minds on the basis of such evidence.2 So, for example, Popper would be quite 
happy with the early picture of Doctor Strange as the heroic, risk-taking neurosurgeon, who was always 
willing to oppose the received wisdom in an effort to save patients. Most importantly, Popper would note 
that scientists like Strange are characterized by taking failure seriously and making changes to their theories 
and methods in response. If a patient dies, Strange would undoubtedly try something different the next time 
around. 
Though Popper’s falsificationism remains highly influential, Kuhn argues that it doesn’t accurately capture the 
way “normal science” actually works. By this, Kuhn simply means the ordinary day-to-day activities of the 
physicists or biologists who are not the Newtons, Einsteins, or Darwins of the world. First, Kuhn notes that 
innovators like Strange are actually pretty rare. The vast majority of practicing scientists spend their lives 
working on a small, well-defined set of problems—or “puzzles,” as Kuhn calls them—that could be answered 
using the theories and methods they learned through years of rigorous schooling, and which their 
communities had picked out as worth solving. They rarely propose entirely novel techniques or methods, and 
certainly don’t consider something as outlandish as sorcery, even if they encounter severe problems. Second, 
absent special circumstances (more on this later), they almost never reject their most fundamental methods, 
theories, or values, even in the face of numerous, seemingly unsolvable problems (such as the many diseases 
and conditions that modern medical science hasn’t been able to treat or cure). However, in the vast majority 
of cases, these failures have not caused biological researchers to abandon the basic ways in which they 
approach problems.  
2 FROM SCIENCE TO SORCERY: HOW SCIENTIFIC 
REVOLUTIONS HAPPENS 
If Kuhn is right, then Doctor Strange’s initial suspicion of sorcery is just what we should expect from a 
practicing scientist. After all, in normal circumstances, science is all about solving certain sorts of puzzles—
identifying new pathogens, developing surgical techniques, designing new drugs, and so on—using all of the 
skills and knowledge acquired after years of formal education and professional practice. To abandon all of 
this in favor of some strange new idea, such as manipulating dimensional energy to fight mystical enemies, is 
almost to abandon science altogether. In fact, Kuhn argues that “mature” sciences like biology and physics 
weren’t even possible until researchers agreed on a shared paradigm that made it possible for them to focus 
their time and energy on identifying and solving ever more specific sorts of puzzles, as opposed to having to 
continually make public arguments about which fundamental theories, methods, or values should be adopted. 
At certain points in history, however, scientists have changed their paradigms, such as when they adopted the 
Copernican, sun-centered model of the solar system over the older Ptolemaic, Earth-centered model. In 
Strange’s particular case, this same sort of shift occurs when he abandons his career as a surgeon for one as 
an aspiring sorcerer. Kuhn spends a great deal of time in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions thinking about why 
and how scientists make such revolutionary changes. He suggests that this process, at least at the level of the 
individual scientist, is both more mysterious and less prototypically rational, than scientists, historians, and 
philosophers have often thought. 
Kuhn argues that scientific revolutions have their roots in the sorts of “puzzle solving” activity that Doctor 
Strange engages in as a scientist, which by its nature involves making ever more precise measurements and 
predictions. Over time, however, these sorts of measurements will reveal anomalies, or areas where the 
existing paradigm’s predictions fail, no matter how many tweaks are made. So, for example, while the Earth-
centered paradigm in ancient astronomy did surprisingly well for over thousands of years, astronomers 
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eventually found themselves needing to make more and more adjustments, such as positing that the planets 
moved in ever-more-complex epicycles in their orbits of the earth, just to keep their paradigm in agreement 
with their increasingly precise observations of the sky.  
In the face of such anomalies, scientists are forced to entertain ever more radical ideas, until they reach the 
very limits of what their current paradigms allow. In Strange’s case, this process takes place with extraordinary 
rapidity, as his quest to heal his injuries leads him first to the frontiers of medicine, then to the miraculously 
healed Jonathan Pangborn, and finally to the Ancient One and everything she shows him. Until the very end 
of this process, however, Strange never gives up on the core commitments of his paradigm: that the 
treatment for his condition will be explicable in terms of human physiology and the biological and physical 
theories on which this is based.  
On Kuhn’s view, Strange’s reluctance to jump ship is entirely understandable. In fact, Kuhn argues that the 
mere existence of anomalies—even glaring, important ones—doesn’t cause scientists to abandon a paradigm 
in which they’ve been trained. Instead, they will abandon such a paradigm only if they are presented with a 
new paradigm that they can adopt in the old one’s place (and they won’t always do so then!). Along with 
offering a solution to the troubling anomalies, this new paradigm needs to make novel predictions and to 
offer an attractive, elegant picture that leaves plenty of room for future work, in the form of unsolved 
puzzles. It is only when the Ancient One presents Strange with such an option that he is finally willing to 
leave his old life behind. 
3 THE DARK DIMENSION? WHY UNDERSTANDING IS 
TOUGHER THAN IT SEEMS 
Much of what we’ve said so far would fit pretty well with how many scientists, historians, and philosophers 
have often described the scientific method. Doctor Strange encounters a problem that he can’t solve, 
formulates and tests a number of hypotheses aimed at producing a solution, and finally, finds one that works. 
Sure, sorcery is a bit different than the sort of scientific theories which work in our world, but that doesn’t 
make Strange’s approach any less scientific. For Kuhn, however, this misses the most interesting aspect of the 
story, which involves the transition between paradigms. When we look back at the history of science (or 
when the Sorcerer Supreme Strange looks back on his life), we might be tempted to think that the paradigm 
chosen in the moment of crisis was obviously closer to the truth than the old one was, and therefore we’ve 
made undeniable forward progress. Kuhn, however, argues that the history of science reveals a much messier 
process. In many cases, there simply are no clear, “objective” criteria that might allow adherents of one 
paradigm to rationally persuade adherents of another paradigm to convert and join their cause.  
In particular, Kuhn argues that paradigm change is far from the sort of slow, incremental process that one 
might expect if scientists were simply incorporating new evidence piece-by-piece into their existing 
paradigms. Instead, new paradigms emerge quite suddenly, and the initial evidence in their favor is often 
relatively minimal, especially when compared to the historical successes of the old paradigm. The first 
scientists to adopt a new paradigm do so because they believe that working in the new paradigm will allow 
them to move forward. However, to adherents of the old paradigm, this often appears as little more than 
blind faith, especially since the new paradigm almost always involves ideas and methods that are alien to the 
point of incomprehensibility. (Just think of how Strange’s medical school teachers might react if he told them 
he’d become a sorcerer!) In Kuhn’s terms, rival paradigms are incommensurable: there is simply no general 
method for translating the concepts taken from one paradigm into those of another. In a very real sense, 
scientists who adopt different paradigms literally experience different worlds, which contain very different 
sorts of things. 
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Kuhn’s claim that paradigms are incommensurable is the most controversial and influential part of his book, 
but it’s also a claim that is easily misunderstood. With this in mind, it will help to look more closely at 
Strange’s experience. When Strange first encounters the evidence of sorcery, such as Pangborn’s cured 
paraplegia and his own initial experiences with the Ancient One—he reacts with disbelief. He eventually 
changes his mind, though, when first, he becomes convinced that sorcery really is the best explanation for the 
anomalies he’s observed, and second, he thinks that sorcery will allow him to solve the sorts of problems that 
interest him (such as his injuries). However, he doesn’t commit to becoming a sorcerer until he finally realizes 
that he can genuinely make a contribution to the field, and help to solve problems that even Mordo and the 
Ancient One struggle with. 
It is at this stage that Strange first encounters the problem of incommensurability. He wants to become a 
sorcerer, and can perhaps even explain some of the general ideas, such as the existence of other dimensions, 
that sorcery is based on. However, as it turns out, adopting a scientific paradigm requires more than 
memorizing lists of formulas. To truly understand things like the nature of dimensional energy, Strange has to 
master the methods for manipulating this energy, which requires long, tedious practice with simple spells. As 
it turns out, novice sorcerers—much like novice physicists—can’t really understand their theories just by 
reading explanations of them in textbooks, or listening to wise old physicists or sorcerers talk about them. 
Instead, they have to learn how these theories are actually applied to standard sorts of problems, which Kuhn 
calls exemplars. The knowledge that Strange gains from this is much more of a “knowledge how” rather than a 
“knowledge that”—it is something he learns to do rather than some theory he has memorized. 
Kuhn argues that scientists adopting a new paradigm learn to “see” the world in a new way through this 
process. So, by the conclusion of his training in sorcery, it’s not simply that Strange has picked up a few new 
tricks, and memorized some complex chants and arm gestures. Instead, he finds himself in something like a 
different world, filled with very different sorts of things than his old world. He is in a world which demands 
that he respond in very different ways. Moreover, this is something that he will likely find difficult to explain 
to colleagues. And if Kuhn is correct, Strange shouldn’t be too surprised if it proves difficult to convince his 
old colleagues of the correctness of his new ideas, even if he manages to get the idea across. After all, the 
sorcery skeptics might argue that contemporary medicine has solved lots of problems, and it would be foolish 
to let a few anomalies centered around one strange doctor cause them to give it up. 
Somewhat surprisingly, Kuhn would also argue that a figure like Strange would be especially well-positioned 
to make paradigm-shifting advances in his new field of sorcery. Kuhn notes that, historically, most scientific 
revolutions were driven neither by the oldest, most experienced practitioners in a field, nor amateurs with 
little or no training. Instead, they were driven largely by people like Strange: newcomers to the field who have 
received enough training to understand how the paradigm works but who haven’t yet become set in their 
ways. Like Strange, such innovators often come from other scientific disciplines and are often seeking the 
solutions to problems that the “normal” practitioners of the field had left unexplored.  
4 PUZZLES ABOUT PARADIGMS 
Kuhn, like Popper before him, fundamentally changed the way that many scholars looked at science. Where 
they once had seen a slow, orderly march toward ever-greater understanding, it now appeared as if scientific 
revolutions had more in common with political revolutions, or even with religious conversions, than with the 
dispassionate application of the “scientific method” taught in schools. While such methods have their place 
to play in normal science, revolutionary science is much closer to Doctor Strange’s initial, baffling encounter 
with the Ancient One. Adopting a new paradigm requires scientists to radically rethink not just their theories 
and methods, but also their overarching view of what the world is fundamentally like and what their role in 
this world is. 
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What does this mean for science in the real world? Should we conclude that the paradigm of sorcery is just as 
trustworthy as that of medicine, and that they have equal claims to be counted “scientific,” for good or ill? 
Kuhn’s writing is a bit ambiguous on these sorts of questions. When The Structure of Scientific Revolutions first 
came out, many readers took it to be arguing that the revolutionary decision of a scientific community to 
abandon one paradigm for another was a fundamentally irrational process, driven by very different factors 
than those relevant to explaining normal science. On this view, the incommensurability between various 
paradigms prevented any and all comparisons between them that might allow for rational choice. For 
example, when working as a neurosurgeon, Doctor Strange is perfectly capable of identifying the best surgical 
techniques to use, and can even explain and defend his choice to interns and colleagues. When he is working 
as a sorcerer, he can do the same thing when it comes to spells. What he can’t do, however, is present a 
rationally compelling argument to a neurosurgeon that they ought to become a sorcerer, or vice versa. 
In later editions of his book, however, Kuhn put a greater emphasis on the existence of more general 
scientific norms that could be used to judge between paradigms, and on the possibility of “translating” 
between competing paradigms. In the end, Kuhn thought the scientists themselves were the ones best placed 
to see how and when it made sense to change paradigms, even if their reasons for doing so couldn’t always be 
made explicit to outsiders. Kuhn even notes the importance of people like Strange—masters of multiple 
paradigms—in this process, since they can help scientists in rival paradigms understand what exactly their 
rivals are up to, and what it might mean to adopt their paradigm as one’s own. While these translations would 
always be partial and incomplete—after all, no one but another sorcerer could fully understand Strange’s 
explanation of sorcery—they provide a good starting point, at least to those who come with open minds. 
Like most philosophers and historians of science, Kuhn himself offered little advice on how contemporary 
scientists ought to do their work. However, he did worry that people were too quick to see “paradigms” 
wherever they looked, and that this caused them to overlook the ways in which mature sciences like physics 
and chemistry really were different from other human activities. For Kuhn, mastering a paradigm required 
much more than simply agreeing on a general outlook on life. Instead, a scientific paradigm required a 
detailed agreements on both what sorts of problems mattered and on the precise manner in which they could 
be solved. It is only because scientists have these agreements that they can get down to the business of puzzle 
solving, which makes up their normal work life. Mature science, for Kuhn, was genuinely and fundamentally 
different from almost everything else humans did.  
5 AFTER KUHN, THINGS GOT STRANGER 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was among the most important and influential books on philosophy of 
science ever published, and it led to major changes in the way many people—philosophers, sociologists, 
historians, and even scientists themselves—saw science. However, rather than ending the debate about the 
nature of science, Kuhn’s book started a number of new debates. To close, we’ll take a brief look at two 
philosophers of science who followed Kuhn, and we’ll consider what they might have to add to our account 
of Doctor Strange’s transition from surgeon to sorcerer. 
Some post-Kuhnian philosophers, such as Paul Feyerabend (1924-1994), embraced and expanded upon the 
idea there were no rational, objective criteria by which one might judge competing scientific theories as better 
or worse, or even for distinguishing “scientific” theories from religious or mystical ones. Feyerabend’s 
methodological anarchism held that, when it came to science, the only rule was “anything goes.” After all, he 
reasoned, once we try to set down rules for excluding certain theories from consideration, we will find that 
we have ruled out obviously legitimate scientific theories.3 
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For example, consider how sorcery must have originally appeared to Doctor Strange. It contradicted basic 
physics; it was based on “primitive” ideas that most people had given up long ago; and sorcerers didn’t 
behave at all like contemporary scientists. They didn’t publish their findings, present them at conferences, run 
randomized controlled trials, and so on. This might seem like more than enough reason to reject sorcery. 
However, Feyerabend argues that, if we look closely at the history of science, we’ll discover that many 
scientific theories (such as the sun-centered solar system) started off in much the same way. Because of this, 
we ought to be very wary of claiming that certain theories just “can’t” work, or that we can simply ignore 
them as possibilities. 
If Feyerabend is right, then real-life neurosurgeons and researchers might benefit from some Strange-like 
openness to ideas from outside of mainstream science. In particular, Feyerabend argues that if science is to 
continue to progress, scientists must continually be open to the possibility that some very different ideas 
might be the source of the next medical or scientific advance, no matter how bizarre they might seem now. 
Moreover, the mere fact that these ideas seem superstitious or mystical is not itself a good enough reason to 
reject them. Even if the vast majority of these theories are flawed in one way or another, the attempt to 
grapple with them will help us better understand why and how the theories we do adopt actually work. 
Feyerabend’s ideas have remained quite controversial among both philosophers and scientists. After all, it’s 
one thing to claim that sorcery could be a science in an alternate world like the one Doctor Strange lives in. 
It’s quite another to claim that scientists in the actual world should have to consider sorcery as a serious rival 
for government funding, or as a possible subject to be included in high school science classes.  
In contrast to Kuhn’s emphasis on the agreement of the scientific community and Feyerabend’s call for 
methodological anarchism, Imre Lakatos (1922-1974) argued that there were clear, objective criteria for 
distinguishing between progressive and degenerating scientific research programs. Interestingly, Lakatos argued 
that the distinction had to do with how the scientists dealt with failure. Like Kuhn, Lakatos argued that 
scientists almost never abandon the “hard core” of ideas that made up the heart of their approach to the 
world. So, the Ancient One doesn’t abandon sorcery after one failed spell, and Doctor Christine Palmer 
doesn’t abandon medicine after the death of a patient. Instead, scientists make modifications to the protective 
belt of ideas around their hard core: the Ancient One might try a new pronunciation for a word and Palmer 
can modify the dose of a drug. Lakatos held that research programs were progressive when these 
modifications to the protective belt led to new predictions and discoveries. By contrast, a program is 
degenerating when the modifications to the protective belt are merely defensive maneuvers intended to 
prevent falsification. That is, in a progressive program, the changes made by the Ancient One and Palmer 
really should lead to better results, as opposed to simply serving as “excuses” for their failures. 
Lakatos emphasized that there was no foolproof way in which philosophers or scientists could determine 
whether a particular, contemporary scientific research program would make progress in the future. After all, 
the history of science is full of examples of promising programs that ran into unforeseen problems, as well as 
of old, abandoned theories finding “new life” in the light of experimental results. Lakatos might not have 
much advice to give to Doctor Strange, other than to remind him of the importance of keeping a careful, 
honest record of his successes and failures, both with respect to medicine and to sorcery. However, Lakatos 
would insist that, when it came for philosophers and historians to tell the story of how Strange came to 
abandon medicine for sorcery, they should be able to explain why his choice was a rational one, based on 
objective criteria. Lakatos thought that both Kuhn and Feyerabend, by playing up the sociological and 
nonrational aspects of the history of science, failed to do just this. 
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6 OF SCIENCE, SORCERY, AND PHILOSOPHY 
For Thomas Kuhn and his rivals, the story of a figure like Doctor Strange might have most value when we 
focus on the contrast between our world and his. Strange provides us with a clear picture of what it would it 
take for a seemingly outlandish idea like sorcery to become a scientific paradigm. Importantly, Kuhn argues 
that this would require much, much more than the mere inability of contemporary medical science to solve 
some problem or other. Instead, we would need to discover, as Strange does, both the existence of significant 
anomalies within current science and the sorcerous solutions to such anomalies. We would need not only to 
present a theoretical justification for thinking that spells might work, but develop a rigorous education 
program for young sorcerers on the precise techniques for various spells. Finally, and most importantly, we 
would need assurance that the paradigm could be extended to new problems through the use of methodical, 
puzzle-solving techniques, and that we, like Dr. Strange, could eventually find our ways to new dimensions. 
More broadly, one might wonder: Why bother with the philosophy of science at all? After all, many scientists 
seem to get along quite well without considering such matters, and their work doesn’t appear to suffer. 
However, this sort of quick dismissal misses some important benefits. First, as Kuhn emphasizes, the mere 
fact that scientists usually don’t need to worry about philosophical issues hardly means that they never do. 
After all, when scientists like Doctor Strange find themselves in the midst of a scientific revolution, they have 
no choice but to consider the big, philosophical questions about reality, knowledge, and the relationship 
between the two. Second, even for those of us who don’t aspire to be scientific revolutionaries, philosophy of 
science can help demystify the “scientific” approach to the world, even when it comes to theories as magical 
as those adopted by Doctor Strange. 
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